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The Employment Conbacts Act was part of the electoral package accepted • tile 
1990 election. The NatioDal Govetn•ncnt was elected with a 
But, in 1993, the Employment Contracts Act was also a part of the 
that the electorate rejected (notwithstanding that the go¥ mt did not 
Moreover, by voting to make fundamental changes to the COUidry's eleotond 
the electorate signalled that the gove.t•mental processes that had been utiliaecl to 
initiate most of the change agenda were no longer acceptable. It is an open question 
as to whether these electoral rebuffs were a reaction to the impact of the Employment 
Contracts Act or whether the catalyst for electoral cbange more to --
imposed and planned in the education and health sectors. In many ways the Prime 
Ministerial Task Force on Employment has captured the mood of the co1mtry 
when stating that "The Employment Contlacts Act re•nains conboversial both in r...; 111 
of its intent and in respect of equity and minimum rights considermious" (Andenon, 
1994: 79). 
This essay focuses on the Employment Contracts Act and the labour market, tackling 
four specific questions: 
o What has been the impact on collective bargaining? 
o What has been the impact on trade unions? 
o What has been the impact of the decollectivisation and decentralisation thrusts on 
labour market outcomes, particularly those related to flexibility, employment and 
equity? 
o Could similar, or even better outcomes, have been achieved by an altei~native 
strategy? 
Current research can provide well-argued responses to the first two questions. The 
authors have presented ongoing reports and assess•nents addressing issues 
on the databases maintained by the researchers. Reports on specific areas of 
have been presented from time to time. The results of this ongoing are 
synthesised in the next two sections of the essay. The last two questions 
more speculative answers and are discussed in later sections of the essay. As noted, 
research and debate with respect to these questions will continue for some · 
Moreover, there is the notion (Walsh and Ryan, 1993), and further historical roaearch 
will confirm, that ideology and power were fundamental motivators of the by 
proponents of the Employment Contracts Act. From such a evea 
substantial economic and social costs would be a price worth paying to tbe 
fundamental shift in employment relationships . and labour market power that 
undoubtedly resulted. In such a case even a well-researched and 
argument is useless in rebuttal. 
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Fifth, on the week. Comd I Ill 
sectors, the1e has beea a -.1 t8 
Monday - Sunday working 
now covered by coutracfl whiah 
Eleven percent are DOW OD a folU sdtlf 
Sixth, on achieving pt#fial Forty-til • ~ 
by contlacts which require 1he maployee to till 
40) before able to attract a pi~•nhn" of pay. 
percent of employees re•nain on cou••acts whiGh do )II8'Vi6l a-
rates of pay for work at night and on wcekeads. 
Seventh, on ovettime and pmal rate pre•niunJL Wllent 
overtime still apply, they apply at broadly similar as tMy 
• 
and a half for the first three hours followed by double ame is the 
for night work within the Monday - aad lrr 
time reanains common for Sunday work. dli8, 
observable bend to reduce the pre•niucn "double tiane" tD ..a • 
reduce "time and a half for the first three hours, by ckn"ble 
and a half throughout". 
Eighth, on leave. The fowth weeks annual leave is typically availlllll 
seven years service with the san1e en•ployer. In the ~ • a 
entitlement applies than in other industries with ll&tlldy ODe f1111*r of 
in that sector being entitled to a fowth weeks annJJaJ just 12 
service with the employer. Special leave (sick, domestic aacl 
more generous than the legislative entitl of five daya per 
days is provided for sick and domestic with 
being given - often on a discretionary basis. P~~eu•aJ 
provision; most employees (80 percent) are enaployed COIIllllfll 
long service leave. 
Ninth, on union TraditioD81 unioDS 
,employees as their agent with over 85 
• 
. tt. 
of 
collective contracts choosing a 1mion C0J11n0t. 
gain "party" status more easily in 1993-94 collective 
and 1992-93 years with over 50 perceQt of eauploy .. 
being under a contract where tb:e •mion had "party" " .. . ' .. t ; • ~ : .. 
Tenth, on the issue of new employees. Many 
to exclude new employees nom the tel"'' and 
not providing for the of the 
percent of employees are by a contract 
extension of that contract to new 
by contracts in which the extension to new 
employer. 
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o the impact on nnionisnt in the private seetor has 
public sector. The absolute decline of union 
sector has been minimal (8 percent between December 1991 aarl 
The public sector, (including teacben, aad ll.ealll& 
domiMnt sector, and a key source of future innovation aacl 
Zealand trade union movement . 
o the energy, transport and manufacturing sectors, some of 1'111 
union strength have, relatively speaking, retained their 
o a pattern of enterprise based, particularly ,.""''"' -J 
emerged to any noticeable extent despite the philosophic base of the 
Some fiagrnentation has developed but this is almost exclusively a 
the expression of specific needs by specific groups of workers. 
In the post-Employment Contracts Act era some industry sectu1s will OJIII• 
minimum union involvement and corporate induced change will domiaate, 
whilst the labour market (in agg&egate or in particular such as 
etc.) remains slack. But in many other areas a challenged, perhaps 
movement will operate with a reorganised, re-oriented, 
approach to the new realities of the market place. Neither a retm:a to 
unionism, nor any real fo1m of legislative feather-bedding of 11nionistn, will bt 
basis of future action. An intel im assessn1ent, to be further widl tile 
of time, is the prediction (Hince, 1993) that a more coherent, cohesive, 
competitive unionism will emerge in New Zealand as a result of tho 
enhanced change. Arguably this was not the intent of the of 
Employment Contracts Act. 
The impact on aggregate outcomes: labour OeiibiUty 
A principal objective of the Employment Contracts Act was the creat.lt& ef 
efficient labour market by increased flexibility, decennaJisation of 
decision making, and minimisation of monopolistic distortions 
productivity at the micro-level and economic growth at the 
There is no doubt that flexibility through variable wage ,. .. , 
practices and work organisations was to be the measure of an 
In fact, the theoretical basis of· the Act was that variations 
specific and individual organisation needs would be the 
There has been change in this direction in some industries 
hotel, and the distribution sectors) where penal rates of pay 
traditional hours have been largely abolished. 
overpowering nor unequivocal in support of the nexus 
gap, narrowed a little by anecdotal evidence, exists in the 
contracting. Have significant variations mnerged, have 
efficiency gains, or has the dominant model been a 
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standard to awards: wages, homs of work. 
also an ag• ecd statement of intent to impl 
maintenance and expansion of the industry 
jobs and job oppommities, improvement of the 
and baining, the development of more effective 
unions and employees, the improvement of tile 
industry, and making the most effective 11M of..., 
a commitment to this mission, and to 
continuous improvement of work, an ..... · ~ .. 
manner and to provide input to decision 
were established in the document. 
The Fisher and Paykel agreement also provided tiJat 
extended to encompass an employee share purchase 
superannuation, a profit sharing bonus, preferendal 
and payments for those employees willing to 
scheme. 
When the Employment Contracts Act was proclaimed the 
one of concern that having concluded a composite --=---
and financial outlay by all parties, it could now fia4 
disturbances by one employee or a sn1all group of enap~ 
different bargaining agents and pursue a private and poaaill(l.p 
Fortunately, this has not eventuated; in fact the continued 
worked to strengthen the cohesion of employees, and hence the 
relationship. The original composite ag•eement expired oa JO 
successfully renegotiated as a collective employment CQntiMt fer a 
• 
The company has maintained its position holding a dominant 
market, has increased exports and established offshore 
Ausbalia to facilitate further expansion in that market. 
• 
Case: Nissa11: In 1987 Nissan (one of five motor-vehicle 
Zealand, a subsidiary ofNissan, Japan) proposed a single site 
organising at its South Auckland site. The proposal 
sought to change the bargaining structure to a site ~ 
consensus a range of changes in work organisation and 
union (numerically the dominant one) supported the DOti-
latter group argued that such an agteement would pit worker 
the work process and fail to deliver pay-backs to 
bitter inter-union (as well as union-company) 
Ryan (1993) reports that five years on those fears have 
consider the changes a success and very few want to 
uses a consultative council of worker and union 
contract negotiations. An agreement operates to 
in return, may be transfeited to any work. Workma llaw 
of four bands, with movement within each band dependent 
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There has always beca a of 
and the systeJn itself sa~1ne 
benefit and sickness benefit are paid at a _. 
unemployment benefit, · tlao• who may be 
benefit to claim that rather than the unemployment benefit, 
increases in unemployment (Brosnan, 1987). 
Workers with disabilities have an· to opt for the more ...... 
option, and therefore not as unanployed. Further, the of tile 
down period for the unentployment benefit in )Mfticular · ac11 
an incentive for individuals to move onto the · bandit 
unemployment benefit to which they might be more correctly 
Wilson and Wong (1989) have also argued that the domestic ,,._ h~mefit 
works to conceal the true level of unemployment in New Zealand. 
It is also worth observing that recent decisions from the judicial system 
encouraged dis•nissed employees to file personal grievance cJaims against their&" .... 
employers. The Social Welfare Depaatn1ent has ag•eed that where a dis•nissal 
being contested by the employee and a personal grievance claim has been filed, 
penalty stand-down period for receiving the unemployment benefit will apply. 
Long-te1m unemployment has steadily increased since 1980, both nn•nerically and 
a proportion of all those unemployed. These increases have been particularly '&&AI. 
in the last six years (from 1988 to 1994). The data in Table 2 shows the extent 
this trend. The long-te~m unemployed, under the OECD definition of 52 
continuous unemployment, as a proportion of all those registered as unemployed 
from 11.7 percent in December 1988, to 33.9 percent in April 1994. The 
of people continuously unemployed for a period of greater than two years rose --
more dramatically; from 2.7 percent in 1988, to 20 percent in 1994. The data is 
Table 2. 
Table 2: Duration profile of registered unemployed : 1988 - 1994 
Pereentage of Unemployed 
·weeks Unemployed Dec 1988 Dec 1992 April 1994 April 
0-13 
. 
45.9 34.6 31.2 58, 
14-25 22.7 14.2 17.7 
26-51 19.7 17.5 17.3 
52-103 9.0 13.7 13.9 25, 
I 04 or longer 2.7 16.1 20.0 
Source: Anderson ( 1994) 
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brief, the Dlllll~ of people on social welfare benefits and not in employment 
"""'"'."'' to grow, as does the duration of uneJtt.ployment Claims that the 
lllr-· Contracts Act has led to a growth in employment would be gteeted with 
_,, these authors. 
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Act with the contrast being likely to be a reflection of the diffc e•¢ 
generally in the labour market by men and women. In particular, 
likely to be in part time positions, in positions tbat are not as ., 
be in the public sector, a sector additionally consb'ained by tight fisoal 
Not only is a "gender effect" apparent, but also it can be shown that the "rich 
getting richer". An official measure of income is the total income for fbl1.time wq~ 
and salary earners as reported by the Department of Statistics. To calculate these 
indexes, gross incomes are first adjusted for income tax liability and tben for 
inflation as measured by the Consumers Price Index. The series therefore 
quarterly changes in the aftertax purchasing power of gross incomes. Only pcrsoDS 
working 30 or more hours per week are included in the series. 
The data are reported in quintiles and are reproduced in Table 3. The data show that 
all quintiles of wage and salary earners except the highest 20 percent, the top quintile, 
have experienced decreases in real income over the period 1980 - 1994. The effects 
on the lowest quintiles of earners are most dramatic in the post-Employment 
Contracts Act period, further demonstrating the "poor getting poorer" effect, at least 
part of which must be attributable to the Employment Contracts Act 
The Department of Statistics plans to discontinue this index, releasing instead a Real 
Wage Rate Index. This new index will not be reported for the income quintiles and 
accordingly in the future the disparities between different income groups will not be 
visible. 
Another way? 
There is no doubt that management innovators associated with each of the cases 
referred to earlier would indicate that change could have been easier to accomplish 
under an Employment Contracts Act regime. However, these cases provide adequate 
evidence to argue that the fundamental power shift brought about by the Employment 
Contracts Act was not a condition precedent for change. A series of Australian case 
studies, and other evidence, can complement the earlier New Zealand experience, to 
illustrate that the objectives of enhanced flexibility, leading to gteater efficiency, 
productivity and a contribution to growth, can occur under a markedly different 
approach to the labour market than that of the Employment Contracts Act . 
Since 1983 a consensus, reached between the Australian Council of Trade Unious and 
the Federal Labor Government, known as the Accord, has dominated the operation 
of labour relations processes. Davis and Lansbury (1993) synthesise this app1oach. 
Productivity incentives became a central focus of the wage system as early as the 
Accord Mark III (1987-88) package. Wage increases and tax cuts liDked to 
restructwing and industrial efficiency at the enterprise level (our emphasis) were 
contained in the 1988-89 package. 
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Real disposable ineome indexes - fall-time wage ud salary eamen 
(1980 - 1994) Base: year ended March 1982 (= 1,•) 
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increases. In 1993, for example, an SB per week wage increaae was made 
safeguard lower paid and tboae in workplaces where no e~teJpdllt 
agreement had been put in place. 
Employer organisations bave reftained tiom direct involvement in the eslabJisbmerJI 
of the A,ccord principles, ·and the public position of · enJployss was t8 
favour the entelptise focus, but not the cenaalised accords that were providiag the 
.developmental framework and impetus in Ausl•aHa Nevertheless, most e•uployers 
and employer organisations have worked with 1mions, and a govetnment agency (tbe 
Australian Indusbial Relations Commission), to implement the agreed model. The 
exception to this employer approach has been a s•naU group collectively identified 
as the "New Right" that have maintained a strong ideological opposition to centralised 
accords and to the role of •mions in both policy development and implementation. 
From 1991 on, key groups of Ausbalian management were to appraise, endorse and 
ultimately envy the anti-union Employment Contracts Act approach to bargaining 
refortn that emerged in New Zealaad. Ideology was a key driving force. In 1993 
the AustraHan electorate rejected the New Zealand approach when presented with an 
electoral package by the then, and still, Liberal-Country party federal opposition. 
Whilst this has not removed the "New Right" opposition, the generally more 
pragmatic response by management has been to further enhance the change process 
endorsed by a national consensus. 
Some specific cases illusbate the type of change at the micro-level: 
Case: Joillt Develop~MIIt Agl'ee~Mnts: Whilst many enterprise ag•eements are 
narrow in focus, others have created fundamental refo11D. The individual ente1p1ise 
agreements entered into by Civil and Civic (a major construction firm), Carlton and 
United .Breweries (with somewhat more than 50 percent of the Australian beer 
market) and MLC Insurance (a major player in the insurance market) are exantples 
of the latter. Each of the above organisations have established enterprise ag«eements 
th~t embrace a common approach and set of principles. They have chosen the label, 
"Joint Development Agteements". 
The process of reaching agteement has been joint, involving a union (or multiple 
unions in the brewery case) and the enterprise. The initial outcome is a document 
which ~establishes mutual objectives, internal operational structures and roles, and a 
basis of future co-operative and productive relationships. These agreements also 
detail the associated reward systems and conditions of employment The 
fundamentals of the workplace refo1n1 strategy of these agreements are the 
introduction of new participative processes, new forms of work organisation, methods 
of skill fotnaation and remuneration. Generalised, the objectives can be as 
developing learning based work organisations, developing more effective and 
adaptable management work practices, providing a career structure for all employees 
based on skills and competencies, improving educational ar1angements, skill 
forn1ation and access to learning, improving job secwity, the provision of high 
standards of occupational health and safety, the elimination of lost time, the 
introduction of new technology and associated change to enhance the competitive 
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Harbridge (1993) argues that has substantial (especially given that 
drive for has Jiom the large e•1tployer). As he notes, the 
syste•n and is aad bas low tJansactional costs for the 
employer in both 8lld New Zealand. But, more importantly, Haabiidge 
argues that the &Jtploarb to at the enterprise level is beina 
with a firmer attentpt to ensure that equity feature in the 
of enteiprise · This emphasis is similar to the changes in New 
under the I.abour Relationa Aot (1981-1991), but in sharp contrast to the 
emerging under the support of the more libertarian market-based 
Con1racts Act. 
Those who seek support fi:om the Sloan position, that the corporatist rather 
market focus has b«-o the cauae of the slow pace of change, should perbaps 
that by mid-1994 only 15 percent of collective contracts in New Zealand wwr.a.a• 
an efficiency-based productivity clause (Harbridge and Honeybone, 1994). N 
Zealand has pwsued the short-teim results of low wage, low cost enhancement 
the ente1prise perfotnJance. The Ausbaliao approach does identify that an al~a 
way did, and continues to, exist. 
At the macro-level, the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions 
economic growth need be kept in mind. Benefits flowing from the &.l&&.l~.,av 
Contracts Act would have been far over-shadowed as a causal impact by 
devaluations (albeit offset by some revaluation) of the New Zealand dollar in 
period since 1984, the improved inteinational price of butter-fat resulting 
world-wide commodity price boom, and the exceptionally low base from which 1 
growth is measured. Given the costs of the divisiveness of the statute and ~ · 
~economic refOIIIJS, the net benefit may ultimately be demonstrated to have been 
less. 
The necessity for decentlaJising the industrial relations focus (or, putting the ~. 
slightly differently, for dis•uantling a national occupational or industrial based 
structure) has also been challenged by a recent Australian based ·" ... 
comparative study. This study (Coelli et al., 1994) undertaken by the Resetve 
suggests that even if ente1p1ise bargaining is resulting from the Accord ~ ...... 
may not have been needed if labour market flexibility had been the sole 
Contrary to much popular perception, Ausbalia's wage setting system, the 
argued, had been flexible by inteiuational standards. 
The study also challenges the accepted view that the award wage system is too · 
for market conditions and that pay deterulination at the ente1prise level will IDlJ: 
economic perfoilhance through higher growth, more jobs, lower inflation or m· m 
productivity. A comparison of 14 OECD countries suggests that the Ausbalian 
market may have been relatively more flexible in the 1970s and 1980s than 
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Commenting on the smvey, and analysis by Puroell (19M), 
legislative change of the Thatcher years has tho 
sector firmly focused on the p1inciple of cost-miirimisatiea. 'l1le 
reported better employee relations and almost no strikes, but.._ 
and injury rates, greater use of · labour and , 
dis•nissal rate twice tbat of1mionised firms. Fhnas in this-seotor \Wie alae leas 
to have grievance procedures, consultative or give 
employees. New Zealand, unfommately, does not yet have 
(let alone longitudinal) data of the slate of workplace incbwh iaJ 
an initial hypothesis tbat the authors would advance is tbat the EIIQ: 
Act has produced a similar set of outcomes. 
An interim assessnaent that the authors concur with, which has explicit in 
and implicit throughout this essay, is that New Zealand has been through a pcriotl 
social Darwinis••• wherein the strong have got stronger, the weak weaker, the 
richer, and the poor poorer, the advantaged have become more so and so have 
disadvantaged. Almost any schisn1 in society tbat existed has widened and 
more overt. Some think this is peat, others are not so sure. Maay new 
have emerged. The Employment Contracts Act has been an · part of the 
forces creating these schisn•s, but, unfortunately, not an essential 
achieving the identified micro-level or macro advantages. Another 
commentator has reached a similar conclusion: 
The ECA has been widely understood to have a auate's egg • pwbaps 
promoting productivity and competitiveness gains but also a llqe pool of 
unprotected, unorganised anployees and a bargaining system beclevllled 
by labour market seganent-ation eff«:ts, gender and race inequalities IDCI tbe impact 
of macho management (Haworth, 1993). 
Perhaps, given the intense political and ideological base of 
Employment Contracts Act, the last word should be left to the 
that the Rt. Hon. J. Bolger, Prime of New Zealand, tho 
Contracts Act 1991 as a cornerstone of policy, a progressive of IIIJII •II 
has played "a decisive role in our dramatic progtess over the past four 
1994b). 
As a consequence he notes: 
. 
We are enjoying the highest growth rate in the OUr 
is among the lowest in the developed world. We have no 
problems. Employmeot inCJeased the by 57,. 
1994a). 
The Hon. Paul Keating, Prime Minister of Australia, 
alteinative stlategies pursued across the Tasanan, noted: 
Ausb•lia bas economic growth the equal of, or S1llplaina, 
Employment growth is high. The profit •bare is blah. 'l1le 
have new flexibility in the labour mlfbt. (AAP 29.9.94) 
• 
n10n 
of 
ancv 
. ' ) less 
l~nnatio~ 
• Dmt of 
It 
o have 
nd 1'\0/\1\tod 
rth~ .. 
qui site 
ups 
)I of 
I lied 
pact 
n 
llation 
;" (Bo 
e 
ent 
>er. 
• • 
of 
References 
Anderson, John (1 
Force on Empl 
Bolger, J. (1994 a), 
Party Conference, 
Bolger, J. (1994 b), 
Politicians Seminar, 
Brosnan, Peter ( 19 
Population Review, 
Brosnan, Peter, Wil 
Supply: A Review 
Relations, 14(1): I 
Coelli, Michael, F 
Labour Market 1 
Australia. 
Davis, Edward and 
Bamber, Greg and 
Relations, (2nd ed.) 
Economic Moni·,, ....... 
Zealand Planning 
Hammond, Suzanne 
Contracts Act on 
18(1): 15-30. 
Harbridge, 
of New Zealand a 
University National 
October. 
Harbridge, 
Representation ~ ... ,."" 
after Two Years, R 
Harbridge, 
Act and Collective 
Harbridge, Raym_ ...... , 
Bargaining Trends 
Relations Centre, p. 
254 Binee and lhrbridp 
Harbridge, Raymond and Moulder, James (1993), Collective tid 
Employment Contracts Act: One Year On, The Joumal oflndilstrlrillteltllitm8, 
62-83. 
Harbridge, Raymond, Hince, Kevin and Honeybone, Anthony (1994), Union 
Union Membership in New Zealand: Annual Review for 1993, New Zealand 
of Industrial Relations, 19(2): 175-180. 
Haworth, Nigel (1993), Notes from the ... ....... ._ in AIRAANZ Review, 2: 1-3. 
Hector, Janet, Henning, Jon and Mary Hubble (1993), Industrial Relations 
in the Retail Non-Food Sector: 1991 - 1992, New Zealand Journal of 
Relations, 18(3): 326-341. 
Hince, Kevin (1993), Is Euro-American Union Theory Universally Applicable? 
Australasian Perspective. In Adams, R. and Meltz, N. (eds.), Industrial 1C.el4artO~ 
Theory: Its Nature, Scope and Pedagogy, New Jersey, Institute of Management 
Labour Relations Rutgers Series, p.408. 
Marshall, Steve (1994), Towards the "Model" Worlcplace: Employer and Union 
Perspectives. Paper presented to the 8th Annual Industrial Relations Conference, 
Institute for Intei••ational Research, Auckland, 16-18 March. 
Mulgan, Margaret (1993), Women at Work: Ensuring Equity in the Employment 
Relationship: The Case for a Minimum Code, New Zealand Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 18(1): 9-15. 
Plowman, David and Favolto, I. (1992), Enterprise Specific Arrangements in New 
South Wales Manufactming, Australian Bulletin of Labour, 18(1): 58-66. 
Pringle, Alistair (1993), The Pursuit of Flexibility in the New Zealand Supa•artarket: 
The Employment Contracts Act, Continuities, and Discontinuities, New Zealand 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 18(3): 306-325. 
Purcell, John (1994), The End of Institutional Industrial Relations, Paper presented 
at the 8th AIRAANZ Conference, University of Sydney, February 10-12. 
Ryan, Rose (1993), ''Japanisation" o~ a ''New Zealand Way"? Five Years on at 
Nissan New Zealand, Working Paper 5/93, Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria 
University of Wellington, p.32. 
Sayers, Janet (1993), Women, the Employment Contracts Act and Labour Flexibility. 
In Harbridge, Raymond (ed.) Employment Contracts: New Zealand ExperlMces. 
Wellington, Victoria University Press. 
Sloan, Judith (1993), Wage Fixing under Award Mark VD and the Role of 
Wage Principles, Australian Bulletin of Labour, 19(3): 218-240. 
ECA 2SS 
and Walsh, Pat (1994), Industrial Relations Research in New Zealand: the State of the 
35(1 piscipline, New Zealand Joumtll of Industrial Relations, 19(2): 161-174. 
-3. 
esented 
on at 
. 
1 ictona 
ribility. 
tences. 
arion~ 
